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1 Introduction
⊢
The librationist system now named £ (libra) is detailed some in (Bjørdal, 2011) and
(Bjørdal, 2012b), but we go beyond those accounts here and inter alia focus more inci-
sively upon aspects related to how it gives rise to new perspectives concerning inferential
principles, and the nature of connectives. The purpose of £ is to deal with the semantical
and set theoretical paradoxes in a novel manner, and it offers a novel set theoretic foun-
dation of mathematical reasoning as well as a theory of truth in a semantically closed
language withouth compromising classical logic. In the following presentation there are
some complexities that need justification, and we will explain some of these to provide
their motivation.
£ is primarily accounted for semantically. We work in a segment Lς of Go¨del’s con-
structible hierarchy L, and the countable ordinal ς needed is the least Σ3-admissible
ordinal. One important aspect of our approach, as pointed out in Section 3, is that
we by means of the austere formation rules of Section 2 are provided an external cod-
ing which identify formulas and expressions of £ with finite von Neumann ordinals of
Lς ; an important advantage of this approach is that we much more transparently and
explicitly than usual find a covering ordinal for the Herzberger style semantic process
using Σ3-collection in the proof of theorem 6.8 (i), and without any invocation of the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem or other notions which may be thought of as presupposing
uncountable sets.
In Section 3 a second coding layer is introduced to provide Go¨del codings of formulas
of £ in £ itself, and this is done in such a way that for an expression E of £ L believes
a natural number is E iff £ believes it is ⌜E⌝. This involves some intricacies, but there
are some major payoffs. The motivation for the following pedantic policies pertaining to
the formal language of £ is stated in Remark 3.3 of Section 3, and these policies enable
our statement of semantical principle P5 in Section 6 and the articulation of the truth
prescription in Section 7.
We use the term thesis for a formula which is librationistically valid, and theorem is
used as expected for results concerning £. We consider a formula A an anti thesis of a
system iff its negjunction (”negation”) ¬A is a thesis of the system. A theory T extends
theory S soberly iff the set of theses of S is a proper subset of the set of theses of T and
no thesis of T is an anti thesis of S. T soberly interprets S iff T interprets S and for no
interpretans Ai in T of the interpretandum A of S does T have Ai as a thesis and an
anti thesis. As it is, £ soberly extends classical logic and impredicative mathematics in
the sense of reverse mathematics.
The central matters we cover are central to our understanding of thinking and rational-
ity, and to a large extent confounding. We will point out that unlike other foundational
systems that are on offer librationism is in a very precise sense a disconnectionist point
of view as £ has theses which are disconnected. £ is not a non-classical system as it ex-
tends classical logic soberly . Unlike paraconsistent systems engendered by adding naive
comprehension to paraconsistent logics suggested in the literature for dealing with the
paradoxes, £ is neither inconsistent nor contradictory. As divulged in Bjørdal (2013) we
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show how £ is able to soberly interpret ZF . As divulged in Bjørdal (2014) we show that
£ also makes it possible to isolate the definable real numbers and so prepare a space for
definable analysis. In section 22 we show that £ has an interpretation of ZFC given
what we name the Skolem-Fraenkel Postulate (Postulate 21.20).
Unlike in (Bjørdal, 2012b) and in earlier superseded accounts of the librationist ap-
proach we use prescription where one would expect axiom schema and regulation where
one would expect inference rule; moreover, prescript is used where one would expect
(proper) axiom and regula should be used if one wants to denote a specific instance of a
regulation. A prescribe is a fundamental thesis which cannot be universally generalized.
Just prescribes, prescripts and prescriptions are posits. The terms cannon and postulate
are for statements that one thinks should be provable as theorems though for reasons
connected with Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem only by means much stronger
than those used to isolate the notion of being a theorem of £.
This and further terminology is introduced in order to make distinctions called for
by new concepts, and also to underline the fact that £ is not an axiomatic or formal
system in the common sense. £ is super-formal , or semi-formal according to what the
author takes as unfortunate contemporary terminology. We suggest to also consider £
a contentual system as it is categorical and so rather more unambiguous with respect
to content than merely formal systems. Nevertheless, one may as much as ω-logic is
partly denoted by the term “logic” also understand £ as a logic, especially as Frege
in the opening phrases of Der Gedanke nails down logic’s subject matter to be truth
itself. For truth is indeed a most central theme of £, and it should be compared with
axiomatic theories of truth as overviewed in Halbach and Leigh (2014); £ much extends
such formal relatives, and provides its sentences with names.
Our considerations concerning librationism are inherently semantical, and soundness
and completeness considerations are irrelevant. As we focus upon one intended model
considerations concerning compactness are extraneous. The posits we isolate are only
examples of formula schemas which hold librationistically and the regulations we display
are likewise just examples of principles which tell us when thesishood is regulated from
that of others. Nevertheless, the prescriptions and prescripts and regulations we do
isolate are quite informative and comprehensive, and they moreover provide librationist
justifications for important axiomatic systems.
2 Fundamentals of £
As in (Bjørdal, 2012b) we continue to consider £ a theory of sorts and thence also a
theory of properties. However, in the final analysis the language of £ may be taken as
just that of the ordinary language of set theory without identity including set brackets
plus two special extra sort constants for truth and enumeration. We take sorts or
sets that are designated by terms (pronomina) that are formed (in a sense made more
precise below) without using the alethizor or the enumerator to be sets. Hence £ is
also an alternative theory of sets, and it contains paradoxical sets as e.g. Russell’s set
{x∣x ∉ x}. So pace Go¨del and others this author now thinks that there always were and
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always will be set theoretical paradoxes.
To avert confusion between object language and metalanguage statements we use the
following boldface syntax for metalanguage statements to denote objects of Lς : paren-
theses ( and ), set brackets { and }, element sign ∈, disjunction ∨, conjunction &,
negation ∼, implication ⇒, biimplication ⇔, variables x, y, z, ..., ordinals α, β, γ,
... existential quantifier Σ and universal quantifier Π; ≺ and ⪯ are the usual orderings
of the ordinals of Lς and N is its set of finite von Neumann ordinals or natural numbers.
The austere Polish language L(£) of £ is its alphabet A(£) plus its formation rules
F(£). A(£) is the two signs . (dot) and ∣ (bar). F(£) is FS(0) − FS(3), FF (0) − FF (9),
FE(0)−FE(9) plus FV (0)−FV (4) as in the following. Minuscule letters from the beginning
of the Latin alphabet range over terms and their capital counterparts range over formulas.
We let u, v, w, x, y, z, u′ and so on stand for arbritrary noemata (see the formation
rules right below). We take m and n to range over natural numbers. For any numeral
n we let ∣n be bar followed by n dots so that ∣0 is ∣ and ∣n+1 is ∣n.; when just the latter
convention is used in presenting we say that the presentation is in bare form, and when
the convention is suppressed so that only bars and dots are used we say that it is in
austere form.
FS(0): ∣0 is the sortifier .
FS(1): ∣1 is the universalizor .
FS(2): ∣2 is the norifyer .
FS(3): Just the sortifier, the universalizor and the norifyer are syncategoremata.
FF (0): ∣3 is the alethizor .
FF (1): ∣4 is the enumerator .
FF (2): ∣5 is a noema.
FF (3): If ∣n is a noema then ∣n+1 is a noema.
FF (4): Nothing else is a noema.
FF (5): Just the alethizor, the enumerator and noemata are praenomina.
FF (6): Just syncategoremata and praenomina are symbols.
FF (7): If p is a symbol then p is a formation.
FF (8): If p and q are formations then pq is a formation.
FF (9): Nothing else is a formation.
FE(0): Praenomina are terms.
FE(1): If a and b are terms then ba is a formula.
FE(2): If A and B are formulas then ∣2AB is a formula.
FE(3): If a and b are terms then ∣2ba is a term.
FE(4): If A is a formula and y is a noema then ∣1yA is a formula.
FE(5): If A is a formula and y is a noema then ∣0yA is a term.
FE(6): Nothing else is a term or a formula.
FE(7): Just terms and formulas are expressions.
FE(8): Just formulas are sentences.
FE(9): Just terms are nomina and sort constants.
FV (0): If A is a formula and y is a noema then all occurrences of y in ∣1yA are variables.
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FV (1): If A is a formula and y is a noema then all occurrences of y in ∣0yA are variables.
FV (2): The first occurrence of y in ∣1yA, or ∣0yA, is the binding variable.
FV (3): All occurrences of y in ∣1yA and in ∣0yA are bound variables.
FV (4): Nothing else is a variable.
The semantical principles of £ in the final analysis compel us to the unusual policies
embodied by FE(8) and FE(9) (cfr. section 10 and 12 for the deeper motivation). The
resulting nominist view supported by £ is accounted for in more detail in section 12, and
the related and necessitated nominist turn is explained in section 13. £ as a consequence
has no free variables. We have instead opted for using the expressions noema (singular)
and noemata (plural) where one would expect free variable. This is inter alia justified by
the fact that one meaning of the word noema as listed in the Oxford English Dictionary
is: A figure of speech whereby something stated obscurely is nevertheless intended to be
understood or worked out . Also, the Greek letter n in the original Greek word nìhma
typographically very much resembles lower case v. We also use variants of Latin nomen
for terms.1
We follow the convention that the expression “X ≜ Y” stands for the idea that X is
defined as Y, and “≜” is accordingly pronounced as “is defined as” or its likes.
Let us define:
D0: yˆA ≜ ∣0yA
D1: ∀yA ≜ ∣1yA
D2: ↓AB ≜ ∣2AB
D3: ↓ab ≜ ∣2ab
D4: Tw ≜ ∣3w
D5: ew ≜ ∣4w
D6: vn ≜ ∣n+5
With these notions we use Hebrew ן (Nun) in our definition of the set of noemata of
expressions:
2.1 Definition.
ן(u) ≜ {u}
ן(T) ≜ {}
ן(e) ≜ {}
1It may be that our knowledge of proto Indo European does not entirely justify us in thinking that
there is an etymological relatedness between Greek nìhma (noema) and Greek înoma (onoma),
but the terms are surely conceptually related enough e.g. in as far as we often come to know things
by their names. Quite possibly, ancient Greek philosophers did not make a connection between these
notions. However these matters may be, in £ we take noemata to also be nomina.
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ן(ba) ≜ ן(a) ∪ ן(b)
ן(ˆ uA) ≜ ן(A) ∖ {u}
ן(∀uA) ≜ ן(A) ∖ {u}
ן(↓AB) ≜ ן(A) ∪ ן(B)
ן(↓ab) ≜ ן(a) ∪ ן(b)
A noema u is present in an expression A iff u∈ן(A). A formula A is a proposition iff
no noema is present in A. A formula A is atomic iff A is of the form ba with terms a
and b. With this terminology, all propositions are sentences, so we do not presuppose
that propositions are extralinguistic entities in our framework. In £ it turns out that all
formulas are parivalent (see section 13 below) with a proposition.
A term a is a cognomen iff no noema is present in a. Some terms are neither cognomina
nor praenomina. A term is a pronomen iff it is a cognomen and neither T (the alethizor)
nor e (the enumerator) occurs in it. In £ we take a sort to be a set iff £ shows that it
is identical with a pronomen.
For any term a and noema u, (a/u) is a substitution function from expressions to
expressions:
(a/u)w ≜ a if u = w, otherwise (a/u)w ≜ w
(a/u)cb ≜ (a/u)c(a/u)b
(a/u)↓cb ≜↓(a/u)c(a/u)b
(a/u)T ≜ T
(a/u)e ≜ e
(a/u)ˆyA ≜ yˆ(a/u)A if u ≠ y, else (a/u)ˆ yA ≜ yˆA
(a/u)(∀y)A ≜ (∀y)(a/u)A if u ≠ y, else (a/u)(∀y)A ≜ (∀y)A
(a/u)↓AB ≜↓(a/u)A(a/u)B
We will make use of a suffix notation and write A(a/u) for (a/u)A. Iterated uses of
the substitution function like A(a/u)(b/w)(c/y) should be written A(a/u, b/w, c/y).
In the metalinguistic account we also presuppose the following definitions:
D7: ¬A ≜↓AA
D8: A ∨B ≜↓↓ AB ↓ AB
D9: A ∧B ≜↓↓ AA ↓ BB
D10: A → B ≜↓↓↓ AAB ↓↓ AAB
D11: A↔ B ≜ (A → B) ∧ (B → A)
D12: a ≜↓aa
D13: a ∪ b ≜↓↓ ab↓ ab
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D14: a ∩ b ≜↓ ab
D15: a ∖ b ≜ a ∩ b
D16: ∃yA ≜ ¬∀y¬A
D17: a∈b ≜ ba
D18: {y∣A} ≜ yˆA
D19: TA ≜ (∃y)(y ∈ {y∣A}), for y∉ן(A) & Πm(m is a noema & m≺y ⇒ m∈ן(A))
The metalinguistic connectives have the precedence order ¬, ∧, ∨, → and then ↔.
Parentheses are suppressed accordingly, and also associativity taken into account and
outer parentheses omitted in order to better the legibility of the metalinguistic presen-
tation. We call the ↓ the joint , and the joint is a connective when operating on formulas
and a juncture when operating on terms; just junctures and connectives defined in terms
of the joint are concourses. As already stated, we use u, v, w, x, y, z, u′ etc. to range
over noemata and variables in the metalinguistic account when availing ourselves of
D(0)-D(19). When needed we use subscripts such as in x0 and x1. A(x, y, z) signifies
that x, y and z are noemata present in A. We use #»x in A(#»x) for A(x0, ..., xn−1) where
n is unspecified for vectors of arbritrary dimension; the quantified expression ∀#»xA is
to be interpreted accordingly. Sentences and nomina that are presented (more or less)
in line with these metalinguistic conventions are said to be in (more or less) presentable
form.
3 Formations as Numbers, Mathematicalism and Coding
We adopt the policy of taking a formation of £ to be the natural number (finite von
Neumann ordinal) of Lς denoted by the binary numeral which is gotten by replacing
every occurrence of “∣” in its austere expression with “1” and every occurrence of “.”
in its austere expression with “0”. Alternatively put, if one in the austere expression
takes “∣” as the numeral “1” and “.” as the numeral “0” one may take the formation
as the natural number denoted by it when taken as a binary numeral. The number
corresponding to any symbol ∣n is 2
n. The length of a natural number n in the binary
system is l(n) = µy(2y > n). Define, for m ⋅ n > 0, m ⌢ n ≜ (m ⋅ 2l(n) + n). l(m ⌢ n) =
l(m)+ l(n) can be shown to hold by induction, and associativity then follows easily. For
formations e and e′ of £, ee′ is taken as e ⌢ e′.
Our approach to formations as natural numbers is one which can be taken in general
to formal and super (semi) formal systems. As an upshot the sets of theses of these
systems may be understood as real numbers, i.e. sets of natural numbers. This supports
amathematicalist point of view which holds that mathematics is more fundamental than
logic. One may want to take the consequence relation of a logic as more fundamental
than its theses or consequences from the empty set of assumptions. However that may
be, from a mathematicalist point of view as suggested here the consequence relation of
any given logic just is a function from real numbers to real numbers.
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The coding function ⌜⌝∶N →N is given by the following recursion wherein △ is taken
to abbreviate ∣1∣5∣2∣2∣2∣5∣6∣5∣6∣5⌜n⌝∣2∣2∣5∣6∣5∣6∣5⌜n⌝:
⌜m⌝ ≜
⎧⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∣0∣5∣1∣6∣2∣2∣2∣6∣5∣6∣5∣6∣5∣2∣2∣6∣5∣6∣5∣6∣5 if m = .
∣0∣5∣2∣2⌜n⌝∣5△∣2⌜n⌝∣5△ if m = n + 1
3.1 Remark. Recall that we adopt the numerical policy of taking “∣” and “.” as the
numerals “1” and “0” of the binary number system denoting finite von Neumann ordinals
of Lς , so that we take expressions of £ to be natural numbers of Lς .
3.2 Remark. ⌜.⌝ is stated in bare form and ⌜n + 1⌝ in bare form modulo ⌜n⌝; it is left as
an exercise to work these out in more presentable forms given definitions D0-D19 above.
3.3 Remark. Our coding function and numerical policy are so devised that for any
formation f of £ a natural number is f according to L iff it is ⌜f⌝ according to £. In
light of our policy laid down above concerning expressions of £ as numbers of Lς , this
means that whenever ef is a formation of £, then ⌜ef⌝ is ⌜e ⌢ f⌝; with the numerical
policy in mind, the following definition is useful.
3.4 Definition. ⌜e⌝⌜⌢⌝⌜f⌝ ≜ ⌜e ⌢ f⌝ = ⌜e ⋅ 2l(f) + f⌝
3.5 Remark. The central idea for the base case is to find the smallest number of N of
L that denotes 0 according to £ without invoking noemata. In more presentable form ⌜.⌝
corresponds with {v0∣¬∀v1(v0 ∈ v1 → v0 ∈ v1)}, but notice that the bare or austere form
is strictly speaking needed to be exact and that the choice of variables is not arbitrary;
to the last point, cfr. remark 3.7 just below. If my count is right ⌜.⌝ is about the size
of 2111. Work the opposite way for the successor case so that the definiens of ⌜n + 1⌝ in
more presentable form is {v0∣v0 ∈ ⌜n⌝ ∨ ∀v1(v0 ∈ v1 → ⌜n⌝ ∈ v1)}. Obviously, one could
presuppose other choices for zero and successor.
3.6 Remark. In the definientia of ⌜n + 1⌝ and of ⌜.⌝=⌜0⌝ as explicated in the previous
remark the Leibnizian-Russellian theory of identity justified in section 4 of (Bjørdal,
2012b) is presupposed.
3.7 Remark. Notice that ⌜.⌝ is a different number from ∣0∣8∣1∣7∣2∣2∣2∣7∣8∣7∣8∣7∣8∣2∣2∣7∣8∣7∣8∣7∣8
in L, but ⌜.⌝ = ∣0∣8∣1∣7∣2∣2∣2∣7∣8∣7∣8∣7∣8∣2∣2∣7∣8∣7∣8∣7∣8 is a maxim of £ given our policy
on alphabetological variants (see Section 5 on this notion) as per principle P6 in the
semantic recursion in Section 6 below. So the notion of identity of £ does not coincide
with that of L.
4 Substitution
We define a substitution function on triples of natural numbers by a course of value
recursion:
sub(⌜vi⌝, i, y)=y
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sub(⌜vi⌝, j, y)=⌜vi⌝ if i ≠ j
sub(⌜ab⌝, i, y)=sub(⌜a⌝, i, y) ⌢sub(⌜b⌝, i, y) for atomic formula ab
sub(⌜↓AB⌝, i, y) = ⌜↓⌝ ⌢ sub (⌜A⌝, i, y) ⌢ sub (⌜B⌝, i, y)
sub(⌜∀viA⌝, i, y)=⌜∀viA⌝
sub(⌜∀vjA⌝, i, y)=⌜∀⌝ ⌢ ⌜vj⌝ ⌢ sub (⌜A⌝, i, y) if i ≠ j
sub(⌜ˆ viA⌝, i, y)=⌜ˆ viA⌝
sub(⌜ˆ vjA⌝, i, y)=⌜ˆ ⌝ ⌢ ⌜vj⌝ ⌢ sub (⌜A⌝, i, y) if i ≠ j
sub(x, i, y)= x if x is not of one of the above forms.
We see that for any term t and formula A(vi), sub(⌜A(vi)⌝, i, ⌜t⌝)=⌜A(t)⌝. Compare
here and in the following (Smorynsky, 1977), p. 837.
We define Sub(x,y)=sub(x, i, y) whenever x is the code of a formula with a noema
and i is the least number such that noema vi occurs in the formula x is a code of, and
Sub(x,y)=x if x is not the code of a formula with a noema. We define SUB(x,y)=Sub(x,⌜y⌝)
and abbreviate SUB(⌜A(x)⌝, y ) by ⌜A(y˙)⌝. Iterated uses are as expected, and if the vec-
tor’s dimensionality is unspecified we write ⌜A( #˙»x )⌝.
5 Alphabetological Variants and their Enumeration
Let TL(A ↔ B) hold in L iff A and B are propositions (“closed sentence”) according
to classical logic in the language of £ which are provably equivalent in classical logic,
i.e. they are Lindenbaum-Tarski congruent . Proposition A is an alphabetological variant
of proposition B iff TL(A ↔ B) or there are cognomina (i.e. terms wherein no noema
occurs) a and b which are alphabetological variants of each other and such that A is an
alphabetological variant of B(a/b). Cognomina a and b are alphabetological variants of
each other iff a = b = T(= ∣3) or a = b =e (= ∣4), or there are cognomina c and d and e
and f such that a =↓cd and b =↓ef and either c is an alphabetological variant of e and
d is an alphabetological variant of f or c is an alphabetological variant of f and d is an
alphabetological variant of e, or there are formulas A and B so that a = {x ∶ A(x)} and
b = {y ∶ B(y)} and (∃x)A(x) is an alphabetological variant of (∃y)B(y).
Cognomina of £, as other formations of £, have a natural order according to their
sizes as natural numbers or finite von Neumann ordinals of Lς . We presuppose a Kura-
towskian definition of ordered pairs here and use the following notation to distinguish
object language and meta language statements involving ordered pairs: ⟨a, b⟩ is an object
language ordered pair of £ and <a, b> is an ordered pair of Lς . We define:
5.1 Definition. <n, b>∈e ≜ n∈N and b is a cognomen and an alphabetological variant
c of b is the smallest cognomen such that ∼Σm(m∈N & m≺n & <m,c>∈e).
6 The Semantics of £
We first define the notion ‘a is substitutable for u in . . . ’ for terms a and noemata u
by the recursion: a is substitutable for u in y when y is a noema; a is substitutable for
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u in cb iff a is substitutable for u in b and in c; a is substitutable for u in ↓ bc iff a is
substitutable for u in b and in c; a is substitutable for u in ↓AB iff a is substitutable for
u in A and in B; a is substitutable for u inˆyA iff either y is not a noema in a or u is
not a noema in A and a is substitutable for u in A; a is substitutable for u in ∀yA iff
either y is not a noema in a or u is not a noema in A and a is substitutable for u in A.
We have here adapted the account of Enderton (2001) p. 113. We also say that a is free
for u in an expression iff a is substitutable for u in the expression, and write F (a,u,A)
when the expression is a formula A and F (a,u, b) when the expression is a term b.
In stating the semantical principles below we use almost presentable form. In defining
the semi inductive Herzbergerian style semantic process (cfr. Gupta (1982) and descen-
dent literature for the related revisionary approach) we use the syntax specified at the
beginning of Secion 2. F is the arithmetical predicate of Lς for formulas of £, and T is
its arithmetical predicate for terms of £. We avail ourselves of the class of von Neumann
ordinals in the transfinite recursion, and let minuscule Greek letters α, β, ... plus the
archaic Ϙ (koppa) denote ordinals and letm and n range over natural numbers. In P5, P6
and P7 we presuppose the Leibnizian-Russellian definition shown adequate in (Bjørdal,
2012b) section 4, so a = b ≜ ∀u(a ∈ u → b ∈ u). ⊧ is a function from ordinals to real
numbers taken as sets of natural numbers of Lς , and we write α⊧A for A∈⊧(α). We
presuppose that formulahood is fulfilled. For T in P5 and below, recall D19 on page 6.
P1: α ⊧ a ∈ {u∣A} ⇔ F (a,u,A) & Σβ(β≺α & Πγ(β⪯γ≺α⇒γ ⊧ A(a/u)))
P2: α ⊧↓AB ⇔ α ⊭ A & α ⊭ B
P3: α ⊧ a ∈↓bc⇔ α ⊭ a ∈ b & α ⊭ a ∈ c
P4: α ⊧ ∀yA⇔Πa(F (a, y,A) ⇒ α ⊧ A(a/y))
P5: α ⊧ Tu⇔ΣA(F(A)&α ⊧ u = ⌜A⌝ ∧ TA)
P6: For <n,a>∈e: If Πm(m≺n ⇒ α ⊧ vm ≠ a), α ⊧ vn = a; else α ⊧ vn = vn−1
P7: α ⊧u∈e ⇔ΣaΣn(a∈N&n∈N&T(a)&α ⊧ u = ⟨⌜n⌝, a⟩ ∧ a = vn)
We define:
6.1 Definition. ⊧γ≜ {A∣γ ⊧ TA}
6.2 Definition. IN⊧ ≜ {A∣F(A) & ΣβΠγ(β⪯γ⇒A∈ ⊧γ )}
6.3 Definition. OUT⊧ ≜ {A∣F(A) & ΣβΠγ(β⪯γ⇒A∉ ⊧γ )}
6.4 Definition. STAB⊧ ≜ IN⊧⋃OUT⊧
6.5 Definition. UNSTAB⊧ ≜ {A∣F(A)}/STAB⊧
6.6 Definition. Limit κ covers ⊧ ≜ Πγ(κ⪯γ⇒(IN⊧ ⊂⊧γ & ⊧γ ⊂IN⊧⋃UNSTAB⊧))
6.7 Definition. Limit σ stabilizes ⊧ ≜ σ covers ⊧ and ⊧σ ⊂ IN⊧
6.8 Theorem (Herzberger).
(i) There is an ordinal κ which covers ⊧.
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(ii) There is an ordinal σ which stabilizes ⊧.
Proof: (i) By definition, ΠA(A∈IN⊧ ⇒ ΣβΠγ(β⪯γ ⇒ A∈⊧γ)). This is equivalent
to ΠAΣβΠγ(A∈IN⊧ ⇒ (β⪯γ ⇒ A∈⊧γ)). As Lς is closed under sufficient collection
we have that ΠA(A∈IN⊧ ⇒ Σβ∈aΠγ(β⪯γ ⇒ A∈⊧γ)) for some a. The ordinal
ν = ⋃{x∣x∈a&Ord(x)} is a covering ordinal. We gauge the amount of collection
needed by using the definition of IN⊧ to see that we have invoked Π2-collection, and
as Πn-collection implies Σn+1 collection in the context of Kripke Platek set theory, this
justifies our choice of Lς with ς as the least Σ3-admissible ordinal. (ii) Let δ be the least
ordinal which covers ⊧. Let {f(n)∣n∈ω} by an adaptation of Cantor’s pairing function
be an enumeration of all elements of UNSTAB⊧ where each element recurs infinitely
often so that if B=f(m) and m≺n∈ω, then there is a natural number n′, n≺n′∈ω, such
that f(n′) = B. Let F (0) = δ and F (n+1) = the least ν > F (n) such that f(n)∈ ⊧ (ν) iff
f(n)∈ ⊧ (F (n)). Let φ = {γ ∣ΣmΣν(m∈ω & ν = F (m) & γ∈ν)}. It is obvious that
φ is a limit ordinal which covers ⊧. It is also clear that if m≺n∈ω then F (m)≺F (n).
Since φ covers ⊧, it suffices to show that B∈⊧φ entails that B∈STAB⊧ to establish
that φ stabilizes ⊧. Suppose B∈⊧φ. By Definition 6.1 on page 9, then φ ⊧ TB. By
definition D19 of page 6, φ ⊧ ∃x(x ∈ {x∣B}) for x∉ן(B) (cfr. Definition 2.1 on page 4).
By P1-4 of page 9, there exists an ordinal ν so that:
a) Πµ(ν⪯µ≺φ⇒ µ ⊧ B)
Since F is increasing with φ as its range, we will for some natural number m∈ω have
that ν⪯F (m)≺φ, so that
b) Πµ(F (m)⪯µ≺φ⇒ µ ⊧ B)
SupposeB∉STAB⊧. By our enumeration of unstable elements where each term recurs
infinitely often we have that B = f(n) for some natural number n, m≺n∈ω. It follows
that F (m)≺F (n)≺φ. From a) and b) we can then infer that F (n) ⊧ B, since we have
supposed that φ ⊧ B. But from the construction of the function F it would then follow
that F (n + 1) /⊧ B, contradicting b). It follows that B∈⊧φ only if B∈STAB⊧, so that
φ stabilizes ⊧.
6.9 Lemma. The least stabilizing ordinal is countable.
Compare the antecedent and now superseded account of Bjørdal (2012b), and relatedly
also Herzberger (1980), (Herzberger, 1982), Cantini (1996), Welch (2003) and elsewhere.
The semantic set up we provide here in important respects deviates from and simplifies
arguments given earlier. Our rather pedantic semantic machinery has an important
pay off as we may realize that the closure ordinal (i.e. the least stabilising ordinal)
is countable without any hint of appeal to anything uncountable as with Lo¨wenheim
Skolem considerations, as no set is uncountable according to Σ3KP . Notice also that
we now presuppose an extension of the formal language which also gives us the real
complement of sets, so that at the initial ordinal 0 for all terms b of £, 0 ⊧ ∀x(x ∉ b) or
0 ⊧ ∀x(x ∈ b).
We let Ϙ - archaic Greek Koppa - be the closure ordinal. We have that Ϙ ⊧ TA iff for
all β⪰Ϙ, β ⊧ A.
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We make the crucial librationist twist to isolate the intended model of librationism,
and shift our attention to those formulas (sentences) A which are such that Ϙ ⊧ ¬T¬A.
So our official definition of what we take as the roadstyle sign is A ≜ Ϙ ⊧ ¬T¬A.
All ordinals α are maximally progression consistent in the sense that α ⊧ B iff
α ⊭ ¬B, and progression closed in the sense that α ⊧ A and α ⊧ A → B only if α ⊧ B.
Suppose A, i.e. not A. It follows that Ϙ ⊧ T¬A as Ϙ is maximally progression
consistent. But Ϙ ⊧ T¬A → ¬TA on account of £ 2
M
below. As Ϙ is progression closed,
it follows that Ϙ ⊧ ¬TA, i.e. ¬A. So A or ¬A, i.e. £ is negjunction (“negation”)
complete.
Our definition of the roadstyle supports the following precise definitions of maxims
(signified with ) and minors (signified with ): A ≜ Ϙ ⊧ TA and A ≜ A &
¬A. As Ϙ is progression consistent we have that A iff both A and ¬A. As £ is
negjunction complete, A iff ¬A. Intuitively, the maxims are the unparadoxical theses
while the minors are the paradoxical ones.
7 Prescriptions, Prescripts and Prescribes as Posits of £
We give a partial list of posits of £. All prescriptions that follow hold with all gener-
alizations, so that generalization is not a primitive regulation. We can show, however,
by an inductive argument going back to Tarski, that generalization holds as a derived
regulation relative to theses which follow from the prescriptions presupposed with all
generalizations. Maximal prescriptions are those which only have maxims as instances,
and they are marked with a subscripted capital M in their appellation. All instances of
minor prescriptions (which are marked with a subscripted minuscule m in their appella-
tion) are theses, but some of their instances are minors.
£
i
M A → (B → A)
£
ii
M (A → (B → C)) → ((A → B) → (A → C))
£
iii
M (¬B → ¬A) → (A → B)
£
iv
M A → ∀xA, provided x∉ן(A)
£
v
M ∀x(A → B) → (∀xA → ∀xB)
£
vi
M ∀xA → A(a/x), if F (a,x,A)
£
1
M T(A → B) → (TA → TB)
£
2
M TA→ ¬T¬A
£
3
M TB ∨ T¬B ∨ (T¬T¬A→ TA)
£
4
M TB ∨ T¬B ∨ (TA → TTA)
£
5
M T(TA→ A) → TA ∨T¬A
£
6
M ∃xTA → T∃xA
£
7
M T∀xA → ∀xTA
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£
8
m TA→ A
£
9
m A → TA
£
10
m ∀xTA → T∀xA
£
11
m T∃xA → ∃xTA
The alethic comprehension prescription:
CAM ∀x(x ∈ {y∣A} ↔ TA(x/y)), if x is substitutable for y in A
The truth prescription:
TM ∀
#»x (TA(#»x ) ↔ T⌜A( #˙»x )⌝)
7.1 Definition. KIND(a) ≜ ∀x(Tx ∈ a ∨Tx ∉ a)
The enumeration precripts:
e
1
M ∀x∃y(y ∈ N∧ < y,x >∈ e)
e
2
M ∀x(x ∈ e → ∃y, z(x =< y, z >))
e
3
M ∀x, y, z(< x, y >∈ e ∧ < x, z >∈ e → y = z)
e
4
M ∀x, y, z(< x, y >∈ e ∧ < z, y >∈ e → x = y)
e
5
M KIND(e)
The prescribes prescription:
PM < n, vn >∈ e, for n ∈ N and corresponding vn∈N
The disunion prescript:
↓M ∀x, y, z(x ∈↓yz ↔ x ∉ y ∧ x ∉ z)
The complement prescript:
M ∀x, y(x ∈ y↔ x ∉ y)
The relative complement prescript:
∖M ∀x, y, z(x ∈ y ∖ z↔ x ∈ y ∧ x ∉ z)
The union prescript:
∪M ∀x, y, z(x ∈ y ∪ z↔ x ∈ y ∨ x ∈ z)
The intersection prescript:
∩M ∀x, y, z(x ∈ y ∩ z↔ x ∈ y ∧ x ∈ z)
7.2 Definition. Let F ≜ F ∖T
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The bivalence prescript:
BM ∀x(Fx→ Fx ∨Tx)
I leave it as an exercise here to verify the prescriptions and prescripts above. But see
(Bjørdal, 2012b) for accounts of a number of prescriptions, some of which are lifted from
Cantini (1996).
There are infinitely many distinct prescribes which contain at least one noema. Impor-
tantly, prescribes are not instances of prescripts and cannot be universally generalized
upon. Nevertheless, by the prescribes prescription fundamental prescribes are instances
of a prescription. As a = b ≜ ∀u(a ∈ u → b ∈ u), v0 = T is an example of a prescribe
relative to the presupposed enumeration e as T is the first cognomen in e.
Librationist comprehension is constituted by those principles which are engendered by
alethic comprehension in cooperation with all posits and regulations of £.
8 Regulations of £
The regulations valid in librationism are sensitive as to whether the initial or conse-
quential theses are maxims or minors. We give a partial list of some salient regulations:
R1 A & (A → B) ⇒ B modus maximus
R2 A & (A → B) ⇒ B modus subiunctionis
R3 A & (A → B)⇒ B modus antecedentiae
R4 A⇒ TA modus ascendens maximus
R5 A⇒ TA modus ascendens minor
R6 TA⇒ A modus descendens maximus
R7 TA⇒ A modus descendens minor
R8 ¬T¬A⇒ TA modus scandens maximus
R9 ¬T¬A⇒ TA modus scandens minor
R10 ∀xTA⇒ T∀xA modus Barcanicus
R11 T∃xA ⇒ ∃xTA modus attestans generalis
R12 T∃xA ⇒ ∃xTA modus attestans minor
R13 A & B ⇒ ¬T¬A ∧ ¬T¬B modus minor
RZ A(x/y) for all noemata x ⇒ ∀xA(x/y) Z-regulation
It is reminded that this list of regulations is not complete, as librationism is not
recursively axiomatizable and no such list can be safeguarded as complete. Moreover,
we have aimed at providing a fairly comprehensive list instead of circumscribing a list
of independent regulations. The Z-regulation is named in analogy with the ω-rule by
using the last letter of the Latin alphabet.
Notice that on account of R1 conjoined with £
i
M
− £ vi
M
and the fact that all general-
izations of the latter are presupposed as prescriptions, £ is super-classical. We take our
regulation modus maximus above to be the reasonable interpretation of modus ponens
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as classically intended, so that the novelty of our regulations does not as we see it con-
stitute a weakening of but an extension of classical principles. However, the facial value
of modus ponens only appeals to thesishod so we use the novel term to distinguish.
We verify regulation R3. Suppose A and A → B. We then have that Ϙ ⊧ TA,
Ϙ ⊧ ¬T¬(A → B) and Ϙ ⊧ ¬T(A → B). That Ϙ ⊧ ¬T¬(A → B) means that A → B is
unbounded under Ϙ. That Ϙ ⊧ TA means that A holds as from some ordinal below Ϙ.
As all ordinals below Ϙ are progression closed, B is unbounded under Ϙ, i.e. Ϙ ⊧ ¬T¬B.
That Ϙ ⊧ ¬T(A → B) means that A ∧ ¬B is unbounded under Ϙ. But so a fortiori also
¬B is unbounded under Ϙ, i.e. Ϙ ⊧ ¬TB. So B and ¬B, i.e. B. The other
regulations are left at exercises, but (Bjørdal, 2012b) can be consulted.
9 e, Countability, Order and Kind Choice
Given the enumeration prescripts of section 6, e is a bijection from N to a full universe as
{x∣x = x}; the non-extensionality of £ prohibits us from talking about the full universe.
Let < be the usual order on N:
9.1 Definition.
i) a ◂ b ≜ ∃x, y(x ∈ N ∧ y ∈ N∧ < x,a >∈ e ∧ < y, b >∈ e ∧ x < y)
ii) a ◂≤ b ≜ a ◂ b ∨ a = b
The following exercise illustrates the paradoxicality of the power set operation and of
sets given by the comprehension condition invoked in Cantorian arguments. Sections 7
and 8 of Bjørdal (2012b) should be compared.
9.2 Exercise. Show that if {x∣x = x} ⊄ a then C = {x∣x ∈ a∧∀y(< x, y >∈ e → x ∉ y)},
f = {< x, y > ∣ < x, y >∈ e ∧ y ⊂ a)} and P(a) = {x∣x ⊂ a} are paradoxical.
9.3 Theorem (The Kind Choice Theorem).
If a is a kind with only kind members, {x∣∃y(y ∈ a∧x ∈ y ∧∀z(z ∈ y → x ◂≤ z))} is a kind
with precisely one member from each member of a.
We leave the proof of the Kind Choice Theorem as an exercise.
10 Curries and Set Theoretical Paadoxes
Let cF ≜ {x ∶ x ∈ x → F}, for some sentence F . By A C
M
, cF ∈ cF ↔ T(cF ∈ cF → F )
is a maxim. £ 8
m
and sentence logic give us cF ∈ cF → (cF ∈ cF → F ). But we
have (cF ∈ cF → (cF ∈ cF → F )) → (cF ∈ cF → F ), so by modus subiunctionis
or modus maximus it follows that (cF ∈ cF → F ). By modus ascendens we get
T(cF ∈ cF → F ), and so next cF ∈ cF follows from alethic comprehension by modus
subiunctionis or modus maximus. So we have that both cF ∈ cF and cF ∈ cF → F
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for any arbitrary sentence F . Clearly, then, modus ponens as classically stated cannot
hold for the roadstyle as otherwise £ would have been trivial.
Now, cF ∈ cF being a thesis, it must either be a minor or a maxim. If we have
cF ∈ cF , we easily derive that F is a maxim, i.e. F . If cF ∈ cF is a minor it
follows that ¬F is a thesis; for then also cF ∉ cF so by alethic comprehension and
modus subiunctionis ¬T(cF ∈ cF → F ) and thence by modus scandens and modus
descendens, cF ∈ cF ∧ ¬F , so that by tautologies and modus subiunctionis, ¬F . It
follows, by parity of reasoning, that for any sentence F , either F is a maxim, F is a
minor, or ¬F is a maxim. But in our contentual framework this is as we knew it to
be, for we observed in the paenultimate paragraph of section 6 that £ is negjunction
complete.
If we consider c ≜ {x∣x ∈ x → }, where  is falsum or a contradiction, we realize that
it behaves semantically as Russell’s paradoxical set {x∣x ∉ x}. Much more complicated
paradoxicalities can be constructed when D in cD iself is paradoxical.
11 The Diagonal Lemma and Semantical Paradoxes
11.1 Theorem (The Carnap-Go¨del Diagonal Lemma). If A(x) is a formula with only
x as a noema, then there is a sentence B such that B ↔ A(⌜B⌝).
Proof: We follow the related account of Smorynsky (1977), page 827. Given A(x), define
A(Sub(x,x)) (see page 8) by replacing all occurrences of x in A with Sub(x,x). Let m =
⌜A(Sub(x,x))⌝. Consider A(Sub(m,m)). As m = ⌜A(Sub(x,x))⌝, A(Sub(m,m)) ↔
A(Sub(⌜A(Sub(x,x))⌝,m)). As ⌜A(Sub(x,x))⌝ is the code of a formula that only has
x as a noema, A(Sub(⌜A(Sub(x,x))⌝,m)) ↔ A(⌜A(Sub(m,m))⌝). So if we take B as
A(Sub(m,m)) we have that B ↔ A(⌜B⌝).
Recall Definition 3.4 and consider the formula Tx⌜⌢⌝⌜→⌝⌜⌢⌝⌜D⌝. By Theorem 11.1
and Definition 3.4 there is a sentence C so that C ↔ T⌜C →D⌝. By using a variety
of sentences D we can generate a wide variety of paradoxical conditions, and other
variations of the Carnap-Go¨del Diagonal Lemma ensure yet further variations as with
the analogous set theoretic paradoxes of Section 10.
12 Nominism: Nominalism Released, Platonism Restrained
As pointed out by Kripke it is common policy in logic to presuppose a generality-
interpretation of variables, or what we instead take as noemata. Such a policy cannot be
sustained in librationism. We need only consider e.g. cv13=v96 to see this. By the previous
section, and as £ is negjunction complete, v13 = v96 is a thesis or v13 ≠ v96 is a thesis.
As identity is kind (see (Bjørdal, 2012b)) either v13 = v96 is a maxim of £ or v13 ≠ v96 is
a maxim of £. Had one adopted the generality-interpretation for £ one would have to
conclude that there is only one object according to £ lest £ be trivial. But a theory that
is trivial or only postulates the existence of one object is not interesting and so we do
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not adopt the generality interpretation. Instead we adopt a nominality-interpretation
where what is usually taken as free variables are considered noemata and nomina, i.e.
names. In our set up v13 ≠ v96 is indeed a maxim, but we have no regulation or regula
that allows generalizing universally.
We take nominism to be the view that all mathematical objects have a name while
it nonetheless upholds the platonist view that mathematical objects are abstract. No-
minism is supported by librationism by the latters avoidance of Cantor’s conclusion that
there are uncountable infinities and insistence instead that there are only denumerably
many obects; for the reader’s comvenience we repeat that it is not claimed anywhere
that Cantor’s arguments are invalid (cfr. (Bjørdal, 2012b) and (Bjørdal, 2011) for more
on this). As there, according to £, are only a denumerable infinity of objects, we have
enough names to name all mathematical objects and we have invoked a nominality policy
with that as objective in our semantics.
Notice that the term “platonism” in the context of set theory is sometimes taken to
stand for the Cantorian view that the endless hierarchy of alephs exists in a non-relative
sense. Here we instead abide by what we take as a more plausible usage of the term in the
philosophy of mathematics where it denotes the view that takes mathematical objects to
be abstract objects. The nominism we propound of course rejects the Cantorian version
of platonism.
13 Contradiction, Contravalence and Complementarity
In this section we develop new ideas which pertain to how the connectives should be
understood in the librationist framework.
As we have seen in section 6, the semantics of £ comes about by elaborations, and a
librationist twist, upon the semi inductive type of approach employed by (Herzberger,
1982) to analyse the Liar’s paradox in a way which in some important respects improved
upon that of (Kripke, 1975). However, there is not a simple duality between the libra-
tionist semantics and an envisioned Herzbergerian style approach as £ has noemata and
no free variables. v13 ≠ v16 may e.g. be a maxim of £ but v13 = v16 is not unbounded
in all Herzbergerian semantic processes. One important aspect of the librationist elab-
oration upon the Herzberger style approach is that we focus upon one semantic process
in order to gain categoricity; this we dub the nominist turn, and it is with the nominist
turn accompanied by the librationist twist that £ becomes a contentual system.
Induced principles for truth and abstraction are such as to e.g. make r ∈ r a thesis of
£ and also the negjunction r ∉ r a thesis of £ when r is Russell’s set {x ∶ x ∉ x} of all
and only those sets which are not members of themselves. However, r ∈ r ∧ r ∉ r is not
a thesis of £; notice that if it had been this would have contradicted that £ is a sober
extension of classical logic. Pay also heed here to the fact that the induced regulations of
£ are all novel and in particular that modus ponens as classically stated is not generally
truth preserving in £.
Librationism indeed comes very close to being a so-called paraconsistent system. How-
ever, I shall on the basis of its semantics argue that £ is neither paraconsistent nor
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inconsistent nor contradictory. This will involve concepts and a terminological policy
from a crestal (meta) level.
A sentence’s valency is the set of von Neumann ordinals of L in the semantical process
where it holds. The valor of a sentence is the least upper bound of its valency, and thus
the union of its valency as we presuppose von Neumann ordinals in the semantic set
up. A sentence has at least one of two values, viz. it can be true or it can be false.
A sentence is true iff its valor is the closure ordinal Ϙ and a formula is false iff its
negjunction is true.
We let V(A) be the valency of A and V(A) be the valor of A. If V(A) ≺ Ϙ, A is false
and not true and we say from our external perspective that A is pseudic; if V(¬A) ≺ Ϙ,
A is true and not false and we say that A is veridic. It turns out that a sentence A is
veridic (pseudic) iff it is a maxim that TA (T¬A), and the latter holds iff A (¬A) is a
maxim. There are no special challenges with accounting for paradoxical conditions that
involve the notions of being pseudical or veridical, for £ has no access to the external
perspective on £ needed to talk about veridicity and pseudicity.
Two sentences A and B are parivalent iff the valency of A, V(A), is identical with
V(B); two sentences are altervalent iff they are not parivalent; two sentences A and B
are contravalent iff V(A) is Ϙ/V(B); the ambovalence of A and B is the intersection
V(A)∩V(B); the velvalence of A and B is the union V(A)∪V(B); the subvalence of A
under B is V(¬A)∪V(B) and the homovalence of A and B is (V(A)∩V(B))∪(V(¬A)∩
V(¬B)).
The connectives do not work truth-functionally in librationism, but they work valency-
functionally and by following the classical interdefinability connections as in any Boolean
algebra. The valency of the negjunction of A, V(¬A), is the contravalence of A; the
valency of the adjunction (conjunction) of A and B, V(A ∧B), is the ambovalence of
A and B; the valency of the veljunction (disjunction) of A and B, V(A ∨ B), is the
velvalence of A and B; the valency of the subjunction (material implication) A → B,
V(A → B), is the subvalence of A under B and the valency of the equijunction (material
equivalence) A↔ B, V(A↔ B), is the homovalence of A and B.
We use sligthly non-standard names for the connectives in part to forestall irrelevant
objections which appeal to something like the one and only true meaning of them in
ordinary language. One should appreciate that the connectives do behave truth func-
tionally for maxims, and so in this essential respect they do have their classical meaning
in ordinary discourse.
Two sentences A and B are incompatible iff their ambovalence is empty and, conse-
quently, A∧B fails to be a thesis. Contravalent sentences are thence also incompatible.
All sentences are contravalent with their negjunction; moreover, if A and B are con-
travalent then A and ¬B are parivalent.
What does “What does it say?” say? A variety of things, to be sure; but we lay
down the convention that a sentence dictates its valor, and that a sentence presents its
valency. Given this convention, we take contravalent sentences to be contrapresentive
and parivalent sentences to be paripresentive. We on occasion say that the sentence’s
valency is the way the sentence dictates its valor.
Two sentences are paridictive iff they dictate the same valor, and otherwise they are
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alterdictive. Two sentences are contradictive iff they are contravalent and alterdictive.
A contradiction is the adjunction of two contradictive sentenes. In consequence precisely
one of two contradictive sentences is true, so it can by our light never be correct, pace
certain paraconsistentists, to maintain contradictions.
Two sentence are complementary iff they are contravalent and paridictive. Two com-
plementary sentences are thence both true, and they dictate the same (viz. Ϙ) in opposite
ways. In particular, for Russell’s set r = {x∣x ∉ x}, r ∈ r and r ∉ r are complementary.
Thence r ∈ r and r ∉ r dictate the same in opposite ways and so do not by our standards
contradict each other.
We cannot strictly speaking say “sentences r ∈ r and r ∉ r are both true” in one
mouthful as r ∈ r and r ∉ r are incompatible. Librationism is committed to a peculiar
discretist or sententialist, though nonetheless holistic, point of view.
We regard a theory as inconsistent iff it has theses of the form A∧¬A, and as contradic-
tory iff it has contradictions as theses; consequently, we hold that a theory is inconsistent
iff it is contradictory. Given the foregoing it is our considered opinion that £ is consistent
and not contradictory. As a consequence librationism should not be considered to be
a dialetheist point of view as dialetheism is canonically characterized as a view which
takes some contradictions to be true. Instead we take librationism to offer a bialethic
point of view.
We take our considerations in this section to meet a challenge that remains one for
those who as some dialetheists believe that a sentence and its contradiction can both be
true. Such paraconsistentists owe others an explanation as to what they in dialetheic
cases think it is a true sentence p says which its true contradictory ¬p contradicts.
14 Coherency, Incoherency and Paracoherency
We take a formula A of a theory T to be a nonthesis of T iff A is not a thesis of T ,
and understand the theory T to be an ordered pair <T⊧, T⊭> where T⊧ is the set of
theses of T and T⊭ is the set of nontheses of T . By the observation towards the end of
Section 6 that in £ we have A iff ¬A, both thesishod of £ and nonthesishood of £
are instrumental in the statements of the posits of £ (Section 7) and in the statements
of its regulations (Section 8). We also understand classical theories as PA and ZF in
such terms as this in that we take modus maximus as the proper understanding of modus
ponens and take all axioms or axiom schemas A of the theory to be asserted while the
negation taken as a nonthesis of the theory. A theory <T⊧, T⊭> is coherent iff T⊧⋂T⊭
is empty, and a theory is incoherent iff it is not coherent.
A sentence A is taken as a contrapresentive thesis of a theory iff A is both a the-
sis and an anti thesis of the theory. Let us agree that a theory is contrapresentive iff
it has contrapresentive theses. A theory is trivial iff all sentences of its language are
theses. Trivial systems and inconsistent theories with simplification or adjunction elim-
ination are contrapresentive. £ is contrapresentive, but neither trivial nor inconsistent.
Contrapresentationism is the view that a contrapresentive theory, such as £, is true.
We say that two formulas A and B of a theory T are connected iff A and B are
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theses of T only if also the conjunction A∧B is a thesis of T . Two sentences disconnect
with each other iff they do not connect with each other. A sentence is disconnected
iff it disconnects with some sentence. A set b is disconnected iff for some set a the
sentence a ∈ b is disconnected. Paradoxical theses of £ are disconnected theses of £,
and vice versa. It is straightforward that if A is not a thesis then A connects with all
sentences, and further that all maxims connect with all sentences. All sentences are
self-connected and the relation connects with is also symmetric, but not transtive. A
theory is disconnected iff it has disconnected theses. A topic is disconnected iff a true
theory about it is disconnected and disconnectionism is the view that there are sound
disconnected theories
Some paraconsistent logics, such as the ones following the approach by Jaskowski, are
non-adjunctive. But such logics do not in and of themselves have disconnected theses,
though extensions of such logics with suitable comprehension principles or semantic
principles may be disconnected if not trivial.
Notice also that £ is distinct from paraconsistent systems in that the latter, including
Jaskowski’s system, do not have ex falso quodlibet , (A∧¬A → B), as a theorem whereas
£ has it as a maxim. We emphasize this obvious corollary for the reason that the failure
of ex falso quodlibet is very arguably a defining feature of paraconsistent approaches.
We correctly hold it against someone if she utters A and thence not A when she
is meant to elucidate a connected topic. However, we take our discussion to have re-
vealed that paradoxes are essentially disconnected. I therefore contend that £ should be
regarded as fulfilling a very important adequacy requirement by being a disconnected
theory about the disconnected and quasi incoherent and absurd topic of paradoxicality.
The librationist theory £ may, as far as its dealing with paradoxical phenomena is
concerned, be thought of as one accompanied with many perspectives which we shift
between in our reasoning in those contexts. One may employ the term parasistency
for this idea that £ lets us stand beyond , so to speak, and shift between perspectives.
We have an external overarching crestal (meta) perspective which helps us illuminate
many issues, as e.g. illustrated here. Besides, for each true sentence its valency may be
thought of as associated with a partial perspective we may take upon mathematical and
semantical reality. There are, then, oscillating switches, as it were, between different
perspectives we may have upon paradoxical sentences, and this justifies our adoption of
librationism’s neologist name. Moreover, such oscillating shifts between perspectives cor-
respond well with our contemplative experiences in connection with the paradoxes, and
so librationism on this count appropriately fulfills an important desideratum, arguably
an adequacy condition, by incorporating them.
It is of course important in all of this that the right balance is struck between various
desiderata. As it is, £ seems well suited to strike precisely such a balance as it soberly
extends classical logic and even soberly interprets classical mathematics in as far as the
latter is consistent. Moreover, theses are only disconnected theses of £ if they are minor
and hence paradoxical theses of £. Our isolated notions of complementarity and valency
functionality appropriately alleviate the loss of intuitiveness brought upon us by the
paradoxical phenomenon of disconnectedness.
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15 Manifestation Points with Parameters
We have earlier indicated that we follow the standard practice of writing A(x, y) to
indicate that the noemata x and y are present in the formula A. We extend this practice
so that we e.g. write c(x, #»z ) to indicate that the noema x and the noemata from the
vector #»z occur as parameters in the term c; as we now work metalinguistically it makes
sense to think as if we invoke noemata as parameters.
We rehearse the definition of manifestation point of section 6 of Bjørdal (2012b) for
convenience and to show that we can make use of instances with parameters.
15.1 Theorem. If A(x, y, z) is a formula with the noemata indicated we can find a term
h(z) such that ∀w,z(w ∈ h(z) ↔TTA(w,h(z), z)).
Proof: Let d = {⟨x, g⟩∣A(x,{u∣⟨u, g⟩ ∈ g}, z)} and h(z) = {y∣⟨y, d⟩ ∈ d}. If we spell
out, we have: h(z) = {y∣⟨y,{⟨x, g⟩∣A(x,{u∣⟨u, g⟩ ∈ g}, z)}⟩ ∈ {⟨x, g⟩∣A(x,{u∣⟨u, g⟩ ∈
g}, z)}}. By CAM we have that ∀w(w ∈ h(z) ↔ T⟨w,{⟨x, g⟩∣A(x,{u∣⟨u, g⟩ ∈ g}, z)}⟩ ∈
{⟨x, g⟩∣A(x,{u∣⟨u, g⟩ ∈ g}, z)}), and so by CAM again it follows that ∀w(w ∈ h(z) ↔
TTA(w,{u∣⟨u,{⟨x, g⟩∣A(x, {u∣⟨u, g⟩ ∈ g}, z)}⟩ ∈ {⟨x, g⟩∣A(x,{u∣⟨u, g⟩ ∈ g}, z)}}, z). But
this is ∀w(w ∈ h(z) ↔TTA(w,h(z), z)), as wanted. As we only invoked generalizable
prescriptions also ∀w,z(w ∈ h(z) ↔ TTA(w,h(z), z)). Obviously, we can have more
than one parameter or a vector of parameters in A.
16 Defying an Orthodox Identity
Theorem 5 of (Bjørdal, 2012b) implies that £ is highly non-extensional in that for any
kind a there are infinitely many mutually distinct kinds coextensional with a. The main
result of this section has the same as consequence for non-empty kinds, but is a more
general result and based upon different considerations.
16.1 Lemma. a = {x∣x ∈ a} only if a is kind.
Proof: Suppose a = {x∣x ∈ a}. By substitution of identicals and alethic comprehension
CAM, ∀xT(Tx ∈ a ↔ x ∈ a), so ∀xT(Tx ∈ a → x ∈ a). By £
5
M ∀x(T(Tx ∈ a →
x ∈ a) → (Tx ∈ a∨Tx ∉ a)), so by classical logic ∀x(Tx ∈ a∨Tx ∉ a) which by the
terminology of (Bjørdal, 2012b) means that a is kind.
16.2 Lemma. If α ⊧ a = b and α ≻ 0 then α ⊧ Ta = b
Proof: As for Lemma 1 of Bjørdal (2012b), and using the librationist definition of identity
and the fact that α ⊧ a ∈ {x∣x = a}.
16.3 Lemma. α ⊧ a = b and β ≺ α only if β ⊧ a = b
Proof: Suppose α ⊧ a = b and β≺α for some ordinal β. It follows that α≻0, so that by
Lemma 16.2 then α ⊧ Ta = b. It follows that for some δ≺α, for all α≻γ⪰δ, γ ⊧ a = b; in
particular δ ⊧ a = b. By the wellfoundedness of ordinals one can iterate the process to
any ordinal β below α.
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16.4 Lemma. If a = {x∣x ∈ a} and β ≺ ϙ then β ⊧ ∀x(x ∉ a)
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that for some b and β: a = {x∣x ∈ a}, β≺ϙ and β ⊧ b ∈ a.
By Lemma 16.3 and the theory of identity, β ⊧ b ∈ {x∣x ∈ a}; by alethic comprehension
CAM, β ⊧ Tb ∈ a; so for some δ≺β, δ ⊧ b ∈ a. But this could be iterated so that we got
0 ⊧ b ∈ a, so that 1 ⊧ a ∈ {x∣b ∈ x}. But by Lemma 16.3 again and our theory of identity,
then also 1 ⊧ {x∣x ∈ a} ∈ {x∣b ∈ x}, so that 0 ⊧ b ∈ {x∣x ∈ a}; but the latter statement is
impossible on account of principle P (1) of our semantics as 0 is the smallest ordinal and
{x∣x ∈ a} is of caliber zero (see Definition 22.18).
16.5 Lemma. If for all β≺ϙ, β ⊧ ∀x(x ∉ a), then a = {x∣x ∈ a}
Proof: Suppose to the contrary. By the logic of identity for all β≺ϙ, β ⊧ ∀x(x ∉ a) and
a ≠ {x∣x ∈ a}. If for all β≺ϙ, β ⊧ ∀x(x ∉ a) also for all β≺ϙ, β ⊧ ∀x(x ∉ {x∣x ∈ a}); this
we can infer without invoking the identity between a and {x∣x ∈ a}. 0 ⊧ a = {x∣x ∈ a},
as 0 ⊧ b = c for all terms b and c. As a ≠ {x∣x ∈ a} there must be a first ordinal γ such
that γ ⊧ a ≠ {x∣x ∈ a}. Let δ be any ordinal smaller than γ. From the information we
have δ ⊧ b ∈ a↔ b ∈ {x∣x ∈ a} and δ ⊧ a ∈ b↔ {x∣x ∈ a} ∈ b for all terms b; moreover, such
biconditionals also hold within any number of applications of the defined truth operator
T. Consequently, there cannot be anything below γ which justifies a sudden change to
non-identity between a and {x∣x ∈ a}.
16.6 Lemma. If for all β≺ϙ, β ⊧ ∀x(x ∉ a), then a = ∅
Proof: Here ∅ = {x∣x ≠ x}. The argument is as for Lemma 16.5.
16.7 Theorem. a = {x∣x ∈ a} iff a = ∅
Proof: The argument is by combining the preceding lemmas.
The non-extensionality results of (Bjørdal, 2012b) and preceding results in earlier
literature referred to there are surprising in the sense that they force us to revise the
prejudice of extensionality in type free contexts by means of explicit conditions that
convince us. Theorem 16.7 is different in that it surprises us in its statement of the
very wide prevalence of non-extensionality in cases where one should not expect it at
all. One may hold against this that some of these features are consequences of a perhaps
arbitrary decision of having all terms of the form {x∣A(x)} empty at the ordinal 0; but
other choices would have had their own blend of arbritrary seeming consequences, and
the author thinks that there are so good aesthetical reasons concerned with uniformity
to support the semantical set up presupposed that it is not arbritrary.
17 Capturing Collection, Replacement, Specification and Choice
We introduce ordinary capture by the following definition, where α(x, y) is any first
order condition on x and y as standardly conceived in classical set theory.
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17.1 Definition (Ordinary capture).
∀v∃w∀x(x ∈ w↔ ∃y(y ∈ v ∧α(y,x) ∧ (∀z)(α(y, z) → x = z)))
Let W be Zermelo set theory Z minus the axiom schema of specification.
17.2 Theorem. ZF =W + ordinary capture
Proof: The condition β(y,x) = α(y,x) ∧ (∀z)(α(y, z) → x = z) is functional, so capture
follows from replacement. If α(y,x) is already functional the clause requiring only one
set captured is redundant, so capture eintails replacement. Specification follows from
capture by letting α(y,x) = β(y) ∧ y = x.
We introduce librationist capture by the following definition, where α is as above and
the order relation ◂≤ as in Definition 9.1:
17.3 Definition (Librationist capture).
If a is a term, so is {x∣∃y(y ∈ a ∧α(y,x) ∧ (∀z)(α(y, z) → x ◂≤ z)))}.
17.4 Proposition (Librationist capture of choice).
If c is a kind with only nonempty kinds whose intersections are pairwise empty for
members not coextensional, then {x∣∃y(y ∈ c ∧ x ∈ y ∧ (∀z)(z ∈ y → x ◂≤ z)))} is a
kind that, modulo extensionality, contains precisely one kind from each kind of c. So
librationist capture entails full choice in those contexts it is operative.
We will see in section 22 that librationist capture in some contexts where extensionality
fails is stronger than ordinary capture also in that the former provides collection and the
latter not. Our considerations in this section are of a general nature, but the relationships
pointed out between capture, replacement, specification and choice carry over to the more
intricate constructions carried out in the next section and in section 22.
Our use of capture is not merely motivated by its pleasing aesthetical qualities such as
that it is a biconditional or that we avoid special restrictions on the invoked first order
condition, but also by the fact that it is a more manageable closure principle which is
more useful for our definitional purposes below.
18 Varieties of Conditions
We explore some uniform maximal closure conditions for H beyond the Jensen rudimen-
tary functions amounting to bounded separation discussed in (Bjørdal, 2012b).
Recall definition 2.1. We make an analogous object language definition:
18.1 Definition.
⌜ן⌝(⌜vi⌝) ≜ {⌜vi⌝}
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⌜ן⌝(⌜T⌝) ≜ {⌜T⌝}
⌜ן⌝(⌜e⌝) ≜ {⌜e⌝}
⌜ן⌝(⌜ba⌝) ≜ ⌜ן⌝(a) ∪ ⌜ן⌝(b)
⌜ן⌝(⌜ˆ viA⌝) ≜ ⌜ן⌝(A) ∖ {⌜vi⌝}
⌜ן⌝(⌜∀viA⌝) ≜ ⌜ן⌝(A) ∖ {⌜vi⌝}
⌜ן⌝(⌜↓AB⌝) ≜ ⌜ן⌝(A) ∪ ⌜ן⌝(B)
⌜ן⌝(⌜↓ab⌝) ≜ ⌜ן⌝(a) ∪ ⌜ן⌝(b)
We define conditions upon noemata.
18.2 Definition. Cnd(x, y) ≜ x is the code of a formula that does not contain ,ˆ T or e
and contains the joint only as connective and not as a juncture and ∀z(z ∈ ⌜ן⌝x → z ∈ y).
We will e.g. have Cnd(⌜α⌝,{⌜v0⌝}) just if α is a first-order condition upon v0 precisely
as in classical set theory without the identity sign as primitive.
For X a possibly more restricted set of (codes of) formulas we define:
18.3 Definition. X-Cnd(x,y) ≜ Cnd(x, y) and x ∈X.
In the following we usually presuppose the full set of first order conditions.
Recall our substitution function SUB of Section 4.
18.4 Definition. z is a Capture without parameters of a via x
Cpt(z, a, x) ≜ Cnd(x,{⌜v0⌝, ⌜v1⌝}) ∧ z = {u∣∃v(v ∈ a ∧TSUB(SUB(x, v), u) ∧
∀w(TSUB(SUB(x, v),w) → u = w)}
18.5 Definition. z is a Capture without parameters of a
Cpr(z, a) ≜ ∃xCpt(z, a, x)
19 Domination
For some gain in effectivity, we state the domination requirements in terms of capture.
19.1 Definition (Domination requirement with parameter of parameters).
D(x, y, a, z) ≜ ∃t(Cnd(t, z) ∧ ⌜v0⌝ ∈ ⌜ן⌝(t) ∧ ⌜v1⌝ ∈ ⌜ן⌝(t) ∧ ⌜v2⌝ ∈ ⌜ן⌝(t) ∧
s = SUB(t⌜⌢⌝⌜∧⌝⌜⌢⌝⌜v1 = v2⌝, y) ∧
x = {u∣∃v(v ∈ a ∧TSUB(SUB(s, v), u) ∧ ∀w(TSUB(SUB(s, v),w) → u = w)})
19.2 Definition (Domination requirement without parameters).
D−(x, y, a) ≜ ∃t(Cnd(t,{⌜v0⌝, ⌜v1⌝, ⌜v2⌝}) ∧ ⌜v0⌝ ∈ ⌜ן⌝(t) ∧ ⌜v1⌝ ∈ ⌜ן⌝(t)
∧ ⌜v2⌝ ∈ ⌜ן⌝(t) ∧ s = SUB(t⌜⌢⌝⌜∧⌝⌜⌢⌝⌜v1 = v2⌝, y) ∧
x = {u∣∃v(v ∈ a ∧TSUB(SUB(s, v), u) ∧ ∀w(TSUB(SUB(s, v),w) → u = w)})
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Domination withouth parameters can now be defined by manifestation point with one
parameter as described in Section 15 above:
19.3 Definition. ∀x(x ∈ D−(h) ↔ TTD−(x,D−(h), h))
19.4 Lemma. ∀x(KIND(D−(x)))
Proof: As £ soberly extends the theory of identity and Peano arithmetic.
19.5 Corollary. ∀x(x ∈ D−(h) ↔D−(x,D−(h), h))
19.6 Definition (Ordinary specification, short hand).
o
anglebarx ∈ a∣α(x)
o
anglebar ≜ {x∣∃y(y ∈ a ∧T⌜α(y˙) ∧ y˙ = x˙⌝ ∧ ∀z(T⌜α(y˙) ∧ y˙ = z˙⌝ → z = x)}
19.7 Lemma (The Impredicativity Lemma).
If z = {u∣u ∈ D−(h) ∧ α(u)}, Cnd(⌜α⌝,{⌜u⌝}) and kind h then a kind w coextensional
with ⋃z is a member of D−(h).
Proof: D−(h) is impredicative as
o
anglebarx ∈ h∣∃u(u ∈ D−(h)∧α(u)∧x ∈ u)
o
anglebar ∈ D−(h). In desired
kind contexts the latter is coextensional with ⋃{u∣u ∈ D−(h) ∧α(u)}.
20 The Skolem Cannon
As in Bjørdal (2012b) we take a sort to be good iff it is hereditarily kind and in H.
20.1 Cannon (The Skolem Cannon).
If c is good and Cpr(z, c) (with possible parameters from H), then so is z.
More precisely, c ∈ H ∧Cpr(z, c) → z ∈ H.
The indebtedness to Skolem’s idea of replacing Zermelo’s imprecise notion of definite
Aussage with the notion now known as first order condition is manifest. Nevertheless,
for stylistic purposes we use the Cannon as a metonym for the title of this section.
Notice that the Cannon is not an original posit, and it amounts to a leap of faith that
it is a theorem, as it were, or a presupposition on a par with the credo in or lore of
the ZF tradition that replacement or collection with first order conditions does not lead
to inconsistency. Given Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, we cannot expect to
prove that the Cannon holds in the librationist semantic set up unless with means that
surpasses the resources used in that set up. We state the two critical adjoint theorems
conditional upon the Cannon:
20.2 Theorem. (∀x)(x ∈ H→ D−(x) ∈ H)
20.3 Theorem. (∀x)(∀y)(x ∈ H ∧Cpr(y,x) → y ∈ H)
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21 Definable Real Numbers
Let Q be the set of rational numbers and < their usual order. We use a formula with
precisely the noemata x and y to appropriately capture Dedekind cuts when defining
the set D of definable real numbers:
21.1 Definition (The Definable Real Numbers).
D ≜
o
anglebarx ∈ D−(Q)∣∃u(u ∈ x) ∧ ∃u(u ∈ Q ∧ u ∉ x) ∧ ∀u(u ∈ x →
∀v(v ∈ Q ∧ v < u → v ∈ x)) ∧ ∀u(u ∈ x→ ∃v(v ∈ Q ∧ u < v ∧ v ∈ x))
o
anglebar
21.2 Theorem. If z is a definable set of real numbers from D with an upper bound in
D then z has a least upper bound in D.
Proof: The hint is to invoke the Impredicativity Lemma 19.7.
22 The Definable Echelon
22.1 Definition (Conditions restricted to u).
Cn(x,u) ≜ x is the code of a formula that does not contain ,ˆ T or e and contains
the joint only as connective and not as a juncture and ∀z(z ∈ ⌜ן⌝x → z ∈ u) and all
the quantifiers of the formula x is a code of are restricted to u.
22.2 Definition (w is an ordinary capture from z of a via x).
Ct(w,z, a, x) ≜ Cn(x, z) ∧ ⌜v0⌝ ∈ z ∧ ⌜v1⌝ ∈ z ∧w = {w∣∃v(v ∈ a ∧
TSUB(SUB(x, v),w) ∧ ∀y(TSUB(SUB(x, v), y) → w = y)}
22.3 Definition (w is a librationist capture from z of a).
C(w,z, a) ≜ (∃x)(Cn(x, z)∧ ⌜v0⌝ ∈ z ∧ ⌜v1⌝ ∈ z ∧w = {w∣∃v(v ∈ a∧TSUB(SUB(x, v),w)∧
∀y(TSUB(SUB(x, v), y) → w ◂≤ y)})
22.4 Definition (Librationist specification, short hand).
anglebarx ∈ a∣α(x)anglebar ≜ {x∣∃y(y ∈ a ∧T⌜α(y˙) ∧ y˙ = x˙⌝ ∧ ∀z(T⌜α(y˙) ∧ y˙ = z˙⌝ → x ◂≤ z))}
22.5 Definition (Librationist semantic specification, short hand).
anglebaru ∈ a∣TSUB(t, u)anglebar ≜ {x∣∃y(y ∈ a∧Tt⌜⌢⌝⌜∧⌝⌜⌢⌝⌜y˙ = x˙⌝∧∀z(Tt⌜⌢⌝⌜∧⌝⌜⌢⌝⌜y˙ = z˙⌝ → x ◂≤ z))}
22.6 Definition (Domination requirement with parameters from z relative to u).
D(x, y,h, z) ≜ ∃s, t(Cn(t, z) ∧ ⌜v0⌝ ∈ z ∧ ⌜v1⌝ ∈ z ∧ s = SUB(t, y) ∧x = anglebaru ∈ h∣TSUB(s,u)anglebar)
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By manifestation point:
22.7 Definition (Domination with parameters from z).
∀x(x ∈ D(h, z) ↔TTD(x,D(h, z), h, z))
22.8 Definition.
i) a
u
= b ≜ a ∈ u ∧ b ∈ u ∧ ∀v(v ∈ u → (a ∈ v → b ∈ v))
ii) {a, b}u ≜ {x∣x
u
= a ∨ x
u
= b}
iii) {a}u ≜ {a, a}u
iv) S(a,u) ≜ {x∣x ∈ u ∧ (x ∈ a ∨ x
u
= a)}
v) ∅ ≜ {x∣x ∈ u ∧ x
u
≠ x}
vi) Ω(a,u) ≜ {x∣x ∈ u ∧ (∀y)(∅ ∈ y ∧ ∀z(z ∈ y → S(z,u) ∈ y) → x ∈ y))}
22.9 Definition (y is a Skolem of b from u).
S(b, y, u) ≜ (b ∈ y
∧∀z(z ∈ y → Ω(z,u) ∈ y)
∧∀z(z ∈ y → D(z,u) ∈ y)
∧∀w,z(w ∈ y ∧ C(z,u,w) → z ∈ y)
∧∀w,z(w ∈ y ∧ z ∈ y → {w,z}u ∈ y)
∧∀z(z ∈ y → ⋃ z ∈ y))
22.10 Definition (u is a Fraenkel of x). F (x,u) ≜ ∀y(S(∅, y, u) → x ∈ y)
22.11 Definition (The definable echelon by manifestation point).
∀x(x ∈ D˙↔TTF (x, D˙))
22.12 Lemma.
i) F (∅, D˙)
ii) ∀x(F (x, D˙) → F (Ω(x, D˙), D˙))
iii) ∀x(F (x, D˙) → F (D(x, D˙), D˙))
iv) ∀x, y(F (x, D˙) ∧ C(y, D˙,w) → F (y, D˙))
v) ∀x, y(F (x, D˙) ∧ F (y, D˙) → F ({x, y}D˙ , D˙))
vi) ∀x(F (x, D˙) → F (⋃x, D˙))
The proof of Lemma 22.12 is by invoking classical predicate logical tautologies. For the
next lemma, recall Definition 7.1.
22.13 Lemma. KIND(Ω(∅, D˙)).
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Proof: Adapt the proofs of Theorem 3 (i)-(iii) of Bjørdal (2012b).
22.14 Lemma.
i) ∅ ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙)}
ii) ∀x(x ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙)} → Ω(x, D˙) ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙))})
iii) ∀x(x ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙)} → D(x, D˙) ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙)})
iv) ∀x, y(x ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙)} ∧ C(y, D˙, x) → y ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙)})
v) ∀x, y(x ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙)} ∧ y ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙)} → {x, y}D˙ ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙))})
vi) ∀x(x ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙)} → ⋃x ∈ {x∣F (x, D˙)})
Proof: The proof of i) is by invoking modus ascendens and alethic comprehension (CAM)
on Lemma 22.12 i). For iii)-vi), invoke also £1M (LO1M of p. 339 of Bjørdal (2012b)), and
for ii) also Lemma 22.13 is invoked, noting that ∀x(x ∈ Ω(∅, D˙) → Tx ∈ Ω(∅, D˙)).
22.15 Lemma. KIND({x∣F (x, Z˙)})
Proof: Adapt the proof of Theorem 3 iii) of Bjørdal (2012b) and invoke Lemma 22.14.
22.16 Lemma. KIND(D˙)
Proof: A consequence of 22.15 given the definition of D˙.
22.17 Definition. Let H be defined by manifestation point as in section 9 of Bjørdal
(2012b), so that we can show that ∀x(x ∈ H↔KIND(x) ∧ x ⊂ H).
Notice that we here and in the following have “H” for “H” to emphasize.
22.18 Definition. The caliber of sorts
A cognomen a has caliber 0 ≜ a is T or a is e or for some A and x, a is ˆxA.
A cognomen a has caliber n + 1 ≜ a is ↓bc and the maximal caliber of b and c is n.
22.19 Theorem. The Regularity Rule for H
If a ∈ H then (∃x)(x ∈ a) → (∃x)(x ∈ a ∧ ∀y(y ∈ a→ y ∉ x))
Proof: We need to extend the argument of Bjørdal (2012b), and therefore first quote
from its page 353:
“We wrote that H is a sort of iterative sorts. This holds in the following sense of a
regularity rule:
If b ∈H then ∃x(x ∈ b) ⊃ ∃x(x ∈ b ∧ ∀y(y ∈ b ⊃ y ∉ x))
We can justify the regularity rule briefly as follows: Suppose instead that b ∈ H
and ∃x(x ∈ b) ∧ ∀x(x ∈ b ⊃ ∃y(y ∈ b ∧ y ∈ x)). As b is hereditarily kind it follows that
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∃x(x ∈ b) ∧ ∀x(x ∈ b ⊃ ∃y(y ∈ b ∧ y ∈ x)). But the latter can only be satisfied if b is
circular, a cycle or has an infinitely descending chain. Given the nature of H, it would
follow that X(0) ⊧ ∃x(x ∈ H), which is contrary to our minimalist stipulations. Hence,
H only contains well-founded sorts as maximal members.”
The proof of (Bjørdal, 2012b) only covers sets with caliber 0. Suppose n + 1 is the
smallest caliber of a set b =↓cd such that b ∈ H and b is not regular, i.e. well-founded.
But this is impossible as the caliber 0 set {x ∶ x ∉ c ∧ x ∉ d} is then also good, i.e.
{x ∶ x ∉ c ∧ x ∉ d} ∈ H; clearly, however, b ⊂ {x ∶ x ∉ c ∧ x ∉ d}, so b is regular as
{x ∶ x ∉ c ∧ x ∉ d} is regular.
22.20 Postulate (The Skolem-Fraenkel Postulate).
If b is good and C(w, D˙, b), w is good. More precisely, b ∈ H ∧ C(w, D˙, b) → w ∈ H.
We write “SFP” to alert that the proof depends on the Skolem-Fraenkel Postulate.
22.21 Lemma. Given Cannon 20.1, Postulate 22.20 holds iff D˙ ∈ H.
Proof: Exercise.
22.22 Remark. If one wants “higher infinities” in a Skolem relative sense in our frame-
work one will need adequate postulates (in analogy with the content of Lemma 22.21)
which we intuit are then equivalent under the Cannon 20.1 with the goodness of such a
Skolem relative “higher” infinity. As one may want a variety of postulates with a variety
of strengths we do not replace the term “Skolem-Fraenkel Postulate” with a metonym.
22.23 Lemma. ∀x, y(x ∈ H ∧ C(y, D˙, x) → y ∈ H)
Proof: Exercise. SFP.
22.24 Lemma. ∀x(x ∈ H→ D(x, D˙) ∈ H)
Proof: Exercise. SFP.
22.25 Theorem. D˙ ∈ H
Proof: Exercise. SFP.
22.26 Theorem. If A(x) is any formula with x free and only ∈ as its non-logical symbol
then a
D˙
= b→ (AD˙(a) → AD˙(b)).
Proof: Exercise. SFP.
Let the following be an axiomatization of ZFC, where the identity sign of A7 abrrevi-
ates the consequent of A8:
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A1 (∀a)(∀b)(∃x)(a ∈ x ∧ b ∈ x)
A2 (∀a)(∃x)(∀y)(y ∈ x↔ (∃z)(z ∈ a ∧ y ∈ z))
A3 (∃x)(∀y)(y ∈ x→ (∃z)(z ∈ x ∧ y ∈ z))
A4 (∀a)(∃x)(∀y)(y ∈ x↔ (y ∈ a ∧A(y)))
A5 (∀x)((∀y)(y ∈ x→ A(y)) → A(x)) → (∀x)A(x)
A6 (∀a)((∀x)(x ∈ a → (∃y)(A(x, y)) → (∃z)(∀x)(x ∈ a → (∃y)(y ∈ z ∧A(x, y)))
A7 (∀a)((∀b)(∀c)(b ∈ a ∧ c ∈ a→ ((∃x)(x ∈ b ∧ x ∈ c) ↔ b = c))) →
(∃b)(∀c)(c ∈ a → (∃x)(∀y)(y = x↔ y ∈ c ∧ y ∈ b)))
A8 (∀x)(x ∈ a↔ x ∈ b) → (∀u)(a ∈ u↔ b ∈ u)
A9 (∀a)(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y↔ x ⊂ a)
22.27 Lemma. If A is one of A1 to A7 then AD˙.
Proof: SFP. A1D˙ holds as D˙ is closed under {a, b}D˙ . A2D˙ holds as D˙ is closed under
union. A3D˙ holds as Ω(
D˙
∅, D˙) ∈ D˙. A4D˙ holds as D˙ is closed under anglebary ∈ a∣A(y)D˙anglebar ∈ D˙.
A5D holds as {x ∈ D˙∣¬A(x)D} ∈ H for any first order condition A(x) given the Cannon
(20.1) and as
(∀x)((∀y)(y ∈ x → y ∉ {x ∈ D˙∣¬A(x)D}) → x ∉ {x ∈ D˙∣¬A(x)D})
→ (∀x)(x ∉ {x ∈ D˙∣¬A(x)D}))
given the Regularity Rule (Theorem 22.19). A6D holds as by theorem 22.23 if a ∈ H
and C(w, D˙, a) then w ∈ H. For suppose ∀x(x ∈ a → (∃y)AD˙(x, y)) and let w =
{w∣∃v(v ∈ a ∧ T(⌜AD˙(v˙, w˙)⌝) ∧ ∀y(T(⌜AD˙(v˙, y˙)⌝) → w ◂≤ y))}; it is then clear that
∀x(x ∈ a → (∃y)(y ∈ w ∧ AD˙(x, y)); so (∀a)(a ∈ D˙ → (∀x)(x ∈ a → (∃y)(y ∈
D˙ ∧AD˙(x, y)))) → (∃z)(z ∈ D˙ ∧ (∀x)(x ∈ a → (∃y)(y ∈ z ∧AD˙(x, y))). A7D holds as for
any given a satisfying the antecedent we may (cfr. section 17) use librationist capture
and {x∣∃y(y ∈ a∧x ∈ y∧(∀z)(z ∈ y → x ◂≤ z)))} then serves as the required choice set.
22.28 Lemma (Dominationpotency).
∀x, y(x ∈ D˙ ∧ y ∈ D˙ → (x ⊂ y ↔ ∃z(∀w(w ∈ z ↔ w ∈ x) ∧ z ∈ D(y, D˙))))
22.29 Exercise. Prove Lemma 22.28. Hint: let z = anglebaru ∈ x∣u ∈ yanglebar.
22.30 Corollary (Weak power).
∀u(u ∈ D˙ → ∃x(x ∈ D˙ ∧ ∀y(y ∈ D˙ → ∃z(z ∈ x ∧ ∀w(w ∈ z ↔ w ∈ y ∧w ∈ u)))))
22.31 Theorem. £ interprets ZF.
Proof: By Corollary 22.30 and Lemma 22.27, £ interprets system S of Friedman (1973)
which by its Theorem 1 interprets ZF.
22.32 Theorem. £ interprets ZFC.
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Proof: Our strategy will here be to extend the interpretation invoked in the proof of
the previous theorem. Whereas Friedman (1973) uses the identity sign to abbreviate
coextensionality, use e.g. ≏ if needed in unravelling to interpret. Adapting Definition 3
in Friedman (1973) let EQR(a) abbreviate
∀x, y(⟨x, y⟩ ∈ a→ (∀z ∈ x)(∃w ∈ y)(⟨z,w⟩ ∈ a)
∧(∀w ∈ x)(∃z ∈ y)(⟨z,w⟩ ∈ a))
a ∼ b abbreviate (∃x)(x ∈ D˙ ∧EQR(x) ∧ ⟨a, b⟩ ∈ x)
a ∈∗ b abbreviate ∃x(x ∼ a ∧ x ∈ b).
In the following we establish the standard Zermelian version, dubbed “the multiplica-
tive axiom” by Russell and others, for ∈∗ of the axiom of choice which is equivalent with
our A7 above under the other principles of ZF : We assume that a set c is such that
c ∈ D˙∧∀a(a ∈∗ c→ ∃x(x ∈∗ a)) and c ∈ D˙∧∀a∀b(a ∈∗ c∧b ∈∗ c∧∃x(x ∈∗ a∧x ∈∗ b) →
(∀y)(y ∈ D˙ → (a ∈∗ y ↔ b ∈∗ y)). As D˙ ∈ H, then c ∈ D˙ ∧ ∀a(a ∈∗ c → ∃x(x ∈∗ a))
and c ∈ D˙ ∧ ∀a∀b(a ∈∗ c ∧ b ∈∗ c ∧ ∃x(x ∈∗ a ∧ x ∈∗ b) → (∀y)(y ∈ D˙ → (a ∈∗ y ↔
b ∈∗ y)). Obviously a ∈ c entails a ∈∗ c, and obviously ∃x(x ∈∗ a) entails ∃x(x ∈ a),
so ∀a(a ∈ c → ∃x(x ∈ a)). Clearly a ∈ c ∧ b ∈ c ∧ ∃x(x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ b) entails
a ∈∗ c∧b ∈∗ c∧∃x(x ∈∗ a∧x ∈∗ b), and we observe that (∀y)(y ∈ D˙ → (a ∈∗ y↔ b ∈∗ y))
entails (∀y)(y ∈ D˙ → (a ∈ y ↔ b ∈ y)). This establishes that ∀a(a ∈ c → ∃x(x ∈ a))
and ∀a∀b(a ∈ c ∧ b ∈ c ∧ ∃x(x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ b) → (∀y)(y ∈ D˙ → (a ∈ y ↔ b ∈ y)). By
the multiplicative axiom for ∈, i.e. also A7, ∃d(d ∈ D˙ ∧ ∀a(a ∈ c → ∃x(x ∈ a ∧ x ∈
d)) ∧ ∀a(a ∈ c → ∀x∀y(x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ d ∧ y ∈ a ∧ y ∈ d → x
D˙
= y))). Let e be a wittness
and consider first ∀a(a ∈ c → ∃x(x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ e)). Suppose b ∈∗ c. Then for some
a, a ∼ b, a ∈ c and thus (∃x)(x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ e)) and thus also (∃x)(x ∈∗ a ∧ x ∈∗
e)). By Lemma 14 of Friedman (1973) a ∼ b ↔ (∀x)(x ∈∗ a ↔ x ∈∗ b). Thence
(∃x)(x ∈∗ b ∧ x ∈∗ e). So ∀a(a ∈∗ c → ∃x(x ∈∗ a ∧ x ∈∗ e)). Consider next
∀a(a ∈ c → ∀x∀y(x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ e ∧ y ∈ a ∧ y ∈ e → x
D˙
= y))). Suppose b ∈∗ c. Then for
some a, a ∼ b and a ∈ c. So (∀x)(∀y)(x ∈ a∧x ∈ e∧y ∈ a∧y ∈ e→ x
D˙
= y)). Suppose
f ∈∗ a ∧ f ∈∗ e ∧ g ∈∗ a ∧ g ∈∗ e. Then for some h and i, h ∼ f ∧ h ∈ a ∧ h ∈ e and
i ∼ g∧i ∈ a∧i ∈ e. Thence h
D˙
= i. Given Theorem 22.26, f ∼ g. By adapting Lemma
19 of Friedman (1973), f
D˙
= g. So ∀u(u ∈ D˙ → (f ∈∗ u ↔ g ∈∗ u)). Consequently,
∀a(a ∈∗ c → ∀x∀y(x ∈∗ a ∧ x ∈∗ e ∧ y ∈∗ a ∧ y ∈∗ e → ∀u(u ∈ D˙ → (f ∈∗ u↔ g ∈∗ u)))).
As c ∈ D˙, {x∣∃y(y ∈ c ∧T⌜x˙ ∈ y˙⌝ ∧ ∀z(T⌜x˙ ∈ y˙⌝ → z ◂≤ x))} ∈ D˙. By adapting Propo-
sition 17.4 {x∣∃y(y ∈ c ∧ T⌜x˙ ∈ y˙⌝ ∧ ∀z(T⌜x˙ ∈ y˙⌝ → z ◂≤ x))} can stand in for e so that
(∃d)(d ∈ D˙ ∧ ∀a(a ∈∗ c→ ∃x(x ∈∗ a ∧ x ∈∗ d)) ∧ ∀a(a ∈∗ c→ ∀x∀y(x ∈∗ a ∧ x ∈∗ d ∧ y ∈∗
a ∧ y ∈∗ d→ ∀u(u ∈ D˙ → (f ∈∗ u↔ g ∈∗ u))))). SFP.
23 Climbing Mahlo Cardinals
With manifestation points we can straightforwardly ascend relatively uncountable and
inaccessible cardinals to the point that all sets are members of a Grothendieck universe
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and to the level of the first hyper inaccessible cardinals when presupposing further pos-
tulates as the Skolem-Fraenkel Postulate. In the following we climb much higher, and
in the presentation we at points are somewhat repetitive as regards notational matters.
We will show how we may start an ascent. Recall Definition 22.9. Let B(u, v) be
∃p, q(u =< p, q > ∧q = {z∣∀y(S(∅, y, v) ∧ ∀w(w ∈ p → ∃r(< w,r >∈ v ∧ r ∈ y)) → z ∈ y)}.
IN be the manifestation point of B(u, v) so ∀x, y(< x, y >∈ IN ↔ TTB(< x, y >, IN)).
As identity is kind-preserving, we have ∀x, y(< x, y >∈ IN ↔ B(< x, y >, IN)). Let
IN(p) abbreviate {z∣∀y(S(∅, y, IN) ∧ ∀w(w ∈ p→ ∃r(< w,r >∈ IN ∧ r ∈ y)) → z ∈ y)}.
23.1 Theorem (Transfinite Recursion on H). If F ∶ H→ H and A is a kind subset of H
then there is a function f such that ∀x, y(< x, y >∈ f ↔ TT(x ∈ A ∧ y = F ({< u, v > ∣ <
u, v >∈ f ∧ u ∈ x})).
Proof: Take the appropriate manifestation point.
23.2 Corollary. With such an f : < a, b >∈f ⇔ a ∈ A ∧ b = F (f ↾ a).
We now define relative Mahlo-cardinals. Let Tr2(x) signify that x is a transitive
set and that all members of x are transitive and let ORD = {x∣x ∈ H ∧ Tr2(x)}. Let
IN = {x∣∃y(y ∈ ORD∧x = {z∣z ∈ IN(y)∧Tr2(z)}}. Let F(f) express that f is a function,
and let D(f) denote the domain of f . NF(x, f) stands for ‘f is a normal function on the
ordinals in x’, i.e more precisely:
f ∈ D(x2) ∧ F(f) ∧ D(f) = x ∧ (δ ≺ η ≺ x → f(δ) ≺ f(η) ≺ x) ∧ (Lim(γ) → f(γ) = ⋃
ξ≺γ
f(ξ)
23.3 Theorem. With manifestation point we define function C:
< α,β,Ξ >∈ C ↔ TT(< α,β >∈ Ord2 ∧ ((¬∃x(x ∈ α) ∧ ¬∃x(x ∈ β) → Ξ = IN) ∧
∀κ(β = κ+1→ Ξ = {λ∣∃Ψ(< α,κ,Ψ >∈ C∧λ ∈ Ψ∧∀f(NF(λ, f) → ∃γ(γ ∈ Ψ∧γ = f(γ))))})∧
∀κ(α = κ + 1→ Ξ = {λ∣∃Ψ(< κ,β,Ψ >∈ C ∧ λ ∈ Ψ ∧ ∀δ(δ ≺ λ→ ∃Υ(< κ,β + δ,Υ >∈ C ∧ λ ∈ Υ)))})∧
(Lim(α) → Ξ = {λ∣∃δ∃∆(δ ≺ α∧ < δ, β,∆ >∈ C ∧ λ ∈∆)}) ∧
(Lim(β) → Ξ = {λ∣∃δ∃∆(δ ≺ β∧ < α, δ,∆ >∈ C ∧ λ ∈∆)})))
23.4 Corollary.
< α,β,Ξ >∈ C ⇔ < α,β >∈ Ord2 ∧ ((¬∃x(x ∈ α) ∧ ¬∃x(x ∈ β) → Ξ = IN) ∧
∀κ(β = κ+1→ Ξ = {λ∣∃Ψ(< α,κ,Ψ >∈ C∧λ ∈ Ψ∧∀f(NF(λ, f) → ∃γ(γ ∈ Ψ∧γ = f(γ))))})∧
∀κ(α = κ + 1→ Ξ = {λ∣∃Ψ(< κ,β,Ψ >∈ C ∧ λ ∈ Ψ ∧ ∀δ(δ ≺ λ→ ∃Υ(< κ,β + δ,Υ >∈ C ∧ λ ∈ Υ)))})∧
(Lim(α) → Ξ = {λ∣∃δ∃∆(δ ≺ α∧ < δ, β,∆ >∈ C ∧ λ ∈∆)}) ∧
(Lim(β) → Ξ = {λ∣∃δ∃∆(δ ≺ β∧ < α, δ,∆ >∈ C ∧ λ ∈∆)})))
We state the Mahlo-Postulate:
< α,β >∈ Ord2 ⇒ ∃x∃Ψ(< α,β,Ψ >∈ C ∧ x ∈ Ψ)
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With £ plus the Mahlo-Postulate we can define a manifestation point analogous to D˙
above, and with appropriate postulates we achieve that the manifestation point is KIND
and hereditarily KIND.
Some places in the literature it is suggested that somewhere around Mahlo is the
limit for how far we can build up inaccessible cardinals from below. One may ask
how far further one can press on with manifestation points such as here. Suggestions are
welcome, but it seems clear to the author that we at least cannot go beyond indescribable
cardinals.
24 Conclusion
We suggest that £ justifies useful set theoretic and mathematical principles more appro-
priately than alternative accounts, and the definable echelon D˙ may serve as an attractive
arena for definable mathematical analysis. We are somewhat interested in how far £ can
account for higher infinities in a relative sense complying with that which was revealed
by my compatriot Thoralf Skolem, but the author wants to underline that he is not
convinced that venturing into the higher reaches of set theory as traditionally conceived
in the end will turn out as edifying. The rationale for this doubt is the fact that £ is
negjunction complete so that it is far from clear that questions concerning definable real
numbers which we can ask at the quite low low and uncontroversially countable end of
the definable hierarchy needs such higher reaches to be settled. It bears repetition that
£ by itself does not even commit to the consistency of ZFC, and the lower reaches of the
definable hierarchy needs little strength beyond £.
We speculate on whether and if so how how category theory may best be thought of
librationistically. We are also concerned with a more general quest as to how we best can
think of concrete crowds (properties), queues (instances of relations), crowds of queues
(relations) and individuals with an extension of £ that lets ut think about them in a
type free, adicity liberal and order eased manner. Such an extended librationist theory of
properties should integrate with modal logics by identifying the evaluations of the eval-
uation semantics set out in Bjørdal (2012a) with alternative veridicality predicates from
the actual truth predicate T, and the accessibility relations between such veridicality
predicates should themselves as the veridicality predicates be members of the domain of
the theory. We envision that such a librationist account of modal logics may overcome
such limitations on modalities taken syntactically as pointed out by Richard Montague
in Montague (1963) and by others. There are, I think, other important fundamental
questions that may be addressed advantageously if librationistically.
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